

TE OHU
KAIMOANA



MĀORI FISHERIES TRUST

**Application for marine consent made by
Chatham Rise Phosphate Ltd to
Mine phosphate on the Chatham Rise**

Submission from Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd

10 July 2014

Attached to online submission form available on www.epa.govt.nz

Our position

1. Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd (Te Ohu) opposes the marine consent application lodged by Chatham Rock Phosphate (CRP) and recommends that it be declined. Te Ohu is not confident that the effects of the proposal on fisheries and the environment will be minor, and is concerned at its potential impact on the interests of Maori in the Fisheries Settlement.

Who are we?

2. Te Ohu has an “existing interest” under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act). Te Ohu is the corporate trustee of the Te Ohu Kai Moana Trust. We were established under section 33 of the Maori Fisheries Act, which implements agreements that were recognised under the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
3. The purpose of Te Ohu Kai Moana Trust is to advance the interests of iwi individually and collectively, primarily in the development of fisheries, fishing, and fisheries-related activities, in order to:
 - ultimately benefit the members of iwi and Māori generally
 - further the agreements made in the fisheries Deed of Settlement and to assist the Crown to discharge its obligations under the Deed of Settlement and the Treaty of Waitangi
 - contribute to the achievement of an enduring settlement of the claims and grievances referred to in the Deed of Settlement.


Alignment with iwi and fisheries submitters

4. The interests of iwi and Te Ohu – as they relate to fisheries - are closely intertwined with those of industry submitters and their experts. Te Ohu works actively with iwi and the wider seafood industry and participates in industry organisations such as the Deepwater Group to protect the interests of iwi and Māori as the beneficiaries of the Settlement. We share the concerns of iwi and fisheries submitters about the potential effects of the proposal on their interests. This submission is intended to complement those of the fishing industry and iwi. Where relevant we summarise the issues raised by them, but acknowledge that they will provide further information.

The effects of the proposal

5. The key questions set out in the diagram below provide a context for our submission.

Figure 1: Key questions



6. In this submission we focus on the Fisheries Settlement interests of iwi, but for completeness, we have also summarised related issues we have identified through our work with industry and iwi.

Phosphate mining on the Chatham Rise

7. CRP is proposing to mine phosphate nodules from the Chatham Rise, initially within an 820 sq. km area for which it has a mining permit, but subsequently from a wider area. CRP is also seeking a marine consent from the EPA in relation to the wider area (10,192 sq. km). CRP proposes to mine at least 30 sq. km of seabed per annum to meet its annual minimum production target of 1.5 million tonnes of phosphate nodules.

Effects on the environment, including fisheries resources

8. The environmental effects of the proposal we are concerned about are summarised below and covered in more detail in the submission made by the Deepwater Group:
 - a. the removal of habitat created by the phosphate nodules is irreversible and will prevent recolonisation of the original benthic communities.
 - b. smothering of sensitive benthic communities will occur in and around each mining block.

- c. the proposed mining area provides habitat for key commercial stocks including ling, hoki, white warehou, silver warehou and hake. The area is well known as habitat for juvenile fish. Given the movements of these stocks through their lifecycle, adverse effects on these fisheries have the potential to flow on into a wider area.
- d. recolonisation of these species in mined areas is uncertain.
- e. disposal of mine tailings will affect water quality through release of trace metals, uranium and elevated levels of organic carbon, with ecotoxic effects on fish that are attracted to the plume and adverse consequences for human consumption of seafood.

Effects on existing management regimes

9. Benthic Protected Areas (BPAs) were implemented by regulation and form part of New Zealand's regime for managing the effects of fishing on marine biodiversity. The creation of these BPAs and responsible fishing practices elsewhere means the industry can be certain New Zealand's biodiversity goals are being met. These areas were protected at the initiative of quota owners (including settlement quota owners) and with the support of the Government. Over half of the area occupied by the Mid Chatham Rise BPA is covered by the application. The mining activity is incompatible with the purpose of the BPA and it is not clear from the information provided by CRP that alternative areas that contain a similar class and quality of habitat are available as substitutes to achieve the same end.
10. In any event, while CRP is considering other areas within their application as "no-mining" areas in order to mitigate against the adverse effects of mining in the BPA, they do not own the seabed and only have the power to manage their own activities, not those of others – including fishers. It should be recognised that if alternative areas are implemented, fishers will be adversely affected.

Adverse effects on the existing interests of Te Ohu and iwi

11. Te Ohu and iwi have an "existing interest" affected by the application, as defined under section 4 (e) of the EEZ Act. Te Ohu's purpose includes contributing to the achievement of an enduring settlement of the claims and grievances referred to in the Deed of Settlement – which was enacted through the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 (the Settlement Act). We cannot accept the statement made in CRP's EIA in that this provision is not relevant "except to the extent that fishing and fisheries are likely to fall within the scope of existing interests."¹
12. The purpose of the Settlement Act is:

¹ Golder Associates (NZ) Ltd, Chatham Rock Phosphate Proposed Mining Operation, Chatham Rise, Consent Application and Environmental Impact Assessment, May 2014, s 9.2.2.2.

- a. *To give effect to the settlement of claims relating to Maori fishing rights*
- b. *To make better provision for Maori non-commercial traditional and customary fishing rights and interests; and*
- c. *To make better provision for Maori participation in the management and conservation of New Zealand's fisheries.*

13. A brief background to this settlement is set out below.

Basis of the Fisheries Settlement

14. Fisheries legislation since the start of the 20th century had included recognition of Maori fishing rights to fish and fishing. By the mid-1980s, the Crown's failure to recognise tribal authority and property in fisheries had to a large extent undermined the ability of Maori to develop effective ways to exercise their authority or protect their rights in a modern context. At the same time, Maori concerns about removal of their ability to participate and lack of recognition of their fishing rights came to a head when the QMS was introduced and ITQ allocated to private interests as a means of preventing further degradation of fisheries.
15. The QMS was introduced in 1 October 1986. In response, Maori obtained an injunction against the Crown to prevent further fish-stocks from being introduced into the QMS until their claims had been resolved.
16. In 1989, Maori and the Crown agreed to an interim settlement to resolve these claims. This settlement recognised that Maori interests in fisheries include commercial and non-commercial aspects. It provided for 10% of the quota for all fisheries in the QMS to be progressively transferred to Maori at 2.5% per year. The Crown established the Maori Fisheries Commission to hold this quota and develop a process to allocate the quota. The Crown was not able to deliver 10% of the quota for some stocks and so it provided cash to the Commission in lieu of the outstanding quota. The Commission used this money to purchase outstanding stocks wherever possible – but was unable to do so for some stocks. For this reason, the current settlement shares for many of these “pre-settlement” stocks are less than 10%.
17. In 1992, a final settlement of Maori fisheries claims was enshrined in the Fisheries Deed of Settlement and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. Under the settlement, the Crown additionally:
 - gave Maori funds to purchase 50% of Sealord Products Ltd
 - guaranteed to provide Maori with 20% of the quota for all species brought into the Quota Management System after that time
 - restructured the Maori Fisheries Commission into the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission to increase its accountability to Maori; and

- agreed to regulate to allow self-management by Maori of fishing for subsistence and cultural purposes
- provided for the Commission to have rights to participate in management and conservation.

18. In return, Maori agreed:

- that all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights and interests were settled
- to stop litigation (including any Waitangi Tribunal claims) about Maori commercial fisheries
- to support legislation to give effect to the settlement
- to endorse the QMS as the appropriate system for the sustainable management of fisheries
- that the Crown should regulate to provide for customary non-commercial fishing.

Reflecting Maori fishing rights in New Zealand's fisheries management system

19. The effect of the settlement is the creation of multiple layers of interests including:

- a. Te Ohu's role in furthering the agreements made in the Fisheries Deed of Settlement and contributing to the achievement of an enduring settlement.
- b. ownership by iwi and Te Ohu of commercial quota and income shares in the fishing company Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (which owns 50% of Sealord)
- c. the special relationship between the tangata whenua and places of importance for customary food gathering,
- d. the rights of kaitiaki to authorise customary food gathering
- e. Maori participation in fisheries management.

Allocation of iwi commercial fishing interests

20. Under the Fisheries Settlement, the Crown agreed to provide Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ), cash and shares in fishing companies to Maori. These were transferred to the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission to allocate to Maori through iwi.

21. The fisheries settlement is intended to benefit all Maori. For twelve years following the settlement agreement, the Commission facilitated debate among Maori about how the commercial fisheries assets should be allocated. The debate focused on three main issues:


- a. how would the assets be managed – centrally, through cooperation a national entity and individual iwi, or by each iwi individually?

- b. to whom should ownership of the assets be allocated, for instance how is an “iwi” defined and how would urban Maori be provided for? In the case of any assets managed centrally, who would hold direct ownership?
 - c. how would full or beneficial ownership be allocated, for instance should it be based on the relative population of each iwi, or the extent of their coastline, or a combination of these factors?
22. By 2003, 96% of iwi agreed the final allocation proposed by the Commission model should advance into law. The model includes the following:
- a. The establishment of central entities that would operate on behalf of all iwi:
 - (i) Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd
 - (ii) Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd
 - (iii) Te Putea Whakatupu - whose purpose is to promote education, training and research, including matters that relate to fisheries, fishing and fisheries-related activities
 - (iv) Te Wai Maori – whose purpose is to advance Maori interests in freshwater fisheries²
 - b. 75% of quota shares for stocks classified as “deepwater” stocks in most of the EEZ would be allocated according to an iwi’s population, while 25% would be allocated according to the percentage of coastline within the quota management area that iwi claim and agree with their neighbours
 - c. quota shares for stocks classified as “inshore” stocks would be allocated fully based on the percentage of coastline within the quota management area that iwi claim and agree with their neighbours
 - d. a special allocation provision within a defined Chatham zone (using a formula of 100% “inshore” stocks exclusively to iwi of the Chathams and 50% of “deepwater” stocks to the iwi of the Chathams and 50% to all iwi by population)
 - e. quota in freshwater fisheries would be allocated to iwi based on an agreement reached between iwi whose rohe falls within the relevant QMA. Where no agreement can be reached, the quota shares will be allocated based on the proportion that the population of each iwi living within the quota management area bears to the combined population of those iwi living within the quota management area
 - f. allocation of highly migratory species or in those QMAs that have no coastline (FMA6) being based on iwi populations
 - g. income shares in Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (which owns 50% of Sealord) are allocated to iwi based on their population.

² Refer sections 94 and 81 of the Maori Fisheries Act.

23. This model is now enshrined in the Maori Fisheries Act 2004. A key duty of Te Ohu is to administer, allocate and transfer the settlement assets. The allocation model identifies 57 iwi (see Schedule 3 of the Maori Fisheries Act 2004). Each iwi would receive assets based on:
- satisfying strict governance and mandating rules
 - allocation based on a mix of an iwi's population and coastline, as outlined above.
24. Figure 1 summarises the settlement assets and the basis for allocation. As at July 2014, fifty five of fifty seven iwi have Mandated Iwi Organisations and Asset Holding Companies in place and have received their "population based" assets (shares in deepwater and HMS stocks, and income shares for Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd). Many iwi have also reached agreement on their coastline interests and have been allocated their inshore quota, and relevant percentage of their deepwater quota. The Wai Maori and Putea Whakatupu Trusts were also established.
25. The model for allocating these assets is illustrated in Figure 2 below. While Te Ohu continues to hold some of these assets on behalf of iwi who have yet to meet the allocation criteria, the allocation task is largely complete.

Figure 2



Settlement interests in affected commercial stocks

26. ITQ is a perpetual right which needs to be protected to create certainty for investment and incentives for good stewardship, that is, action to ensure sustainability. These rights are well canvassed in the submission made by DWG, who point out that holders of ITQ have interests “not only in a right to harvest fishstocks, but also the management and protection of fisheries resources and the wider marine environment”.
27. ITQ allocated as part of the Fisheries Settlement includes these same characteristics but has the additional significance of forming the currency of a Treaty settlement.
28. The Fisheries Settlement is a full and final settlement. Settlement quota³ cannot be sold outside the “Maori pool” (Mandated Iwi Organisations and settlement entities).
29. For the Settlement to have integrity, the Crown has a duty to protect the ability of iwi and settlement entities to utilise settlement assets. In agreeing to settle their claims, Maori accepted the QMS provided the best framework for managing commercial fisheries sustainably. This regime created the incentives for active management by rights-holders but with underlying Crown responsibility to protect the sustainability of fisheries resources. In this respect, Maori agreed the Crown can regulate and make decisions for sustainability reasons. However they did not accept that these rights could simply be reallocated to others.
30. We note that in section 9.3 of their EIA, CRP comment, in relation to Te Tau Ihu, that “any fisheries settlement assets of iwi and hapu are considered to be a potential existing interest”. We consider it is important to clarify that these interests are not potential – they exist now.
31. All fifty seven iwi eligible for the allocation of settlement assets have existing interests in relation to CRPs proposal through their interest in stocks classified under the Maori Fisheries Act as “deepwater” stocks, many of which are harvested on the Chatham Rise. As noted earlier, key stocks include hoki (in which settlement quota forms 10% of the total quota for HOK1), ling (in which settlement quota forms around 9.6% of LIN3 and 10% of LIN4). Settlement quota for other stocks including white and silver warehou amount to 20%, and just under 10% respectively. Examples of iwi interests in settlement quota for a selection of stocks fished on the Chatham Rise are contained in the Appendix.
32. As DWG points out, the entire proposed mining area overlaps with a ling long-line fishery and approximately 50% of the proposed mining area overlaps with

³ This quota is distinguished from “normal quota” by being classed as “settlement quota” (“SQ”) in the quota register held by FishServe. It can only be held by Asset Holding Companies that are established by Mandated Iwi Organisations and cannot be traded to others outside the settlement pool.

areas utilised (or able to be utilised) by trawl fisheries. In addition, the proposed activity will directly exclude commercial fishing during each mining cycle.

33. The Deepwater Group has estimated that the value of commercial fishing on the Chatham Rise is over \$130 million per year. Adverse effects on fishstocks, and the regime that supports management will have flow-on effects on the value that iwi obtain from their settlement quota. It would also affect the dividends that iwi and Te Ohu receive from their income shares in AFL (see below). For many iwi, income from the sale of their ACE for these fisheries, along with dividends from AFL, form an important part of their overall portfolio.


Interests of Te Ohu and iwi in fishing companies

34. Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (AFL) and Sealord are integral to the Fisheries Settlement. Te Ohu appoints the directors of AFL. Iwi hold 80% of the income shares, while Te Ohu holds 20%.
35. Fifty percent of Sealord is owned by AFL, and 50% by Nippon Suisan Kaisha Limited (Nissui). AFL/Sealord has a key interest and involvement in deepwater fisheries on the Chatham Rise through quota in various fisheries including hoki, along with arrangements with iwi to harvest their settlement quota. Adverse effects of the proposal on Sealord's ability to gain value from these fisheries will ultimately affect the benefits iwi receive as part of the overall settlement package.

The customary non-commercial aspects of the Fisheries Settlement

36. Customary non-commercial interests are provided for through the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing) Regulations 2013, the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998, the Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing) Regulations 1999 (which apply in South Island fisheries waters) and sections 186A & B of the Fisheries Act 1996. These provide access to seafood for customary non-commercial purposes, and for iwi and hapu to exercise management rights over customary fishing areas and fisheries resources.
37. Under the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations, tangata whenua can appoint kaitiaki to authorise customary non-commercial fishing within a defined "rohe moana".
38. A large area surrounding the Chatham Islands has been confirmed as a rohe moana under the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations. Responsibility for this area is shared by Ngati Mutunga and Moriori. In addition, there are other areas defined under both these and the Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing) regulations that intersect the area under application (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Rohe moana encompassing the Chatham Islands



Cultural aspects of Maori interests in fisheries

39. There are cultural elements to the broad interests that iwi have in fisheries which are in part, reflected in the Fisheries Settlement and in the Fisheries Act. For one thing, as part of the Fisheries Settlement, Maori endorsed the QMS as an appropriate system for managing commercial fisheries in the modern context. We consider the sustainable management of commercial fisheries under the QMS to be aligned with Maori concepts of resource management such as kaitiakitanga, which clearly also applies in respect of Maori non-commercial fisheries.

40. While CRP has shown a willingness to work with and develop a relationship with Chatham iwi and imi, CRP's EIA states that "the cultural interests of iwi and imi do not equate to existing interests"⁴. We strongly dispute this claim, and note that this view is not supported by the final report of the Decision Making Committee (DMC) on the Trans-Tasman Resources application. The report comments that:

Those matters of cultural relevance are addressed through the EPA's obligation to notify relevant Maori groups of consent applications, the ability of the DMC to receive specialist advice on matters pertaining to Maori from the Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao (the Maori Advisory Committee) and the requirement to take into account the effect of activities on existing interests (paragraph 96).

41. Moreover, it was:

satisfied that the EEZ Act anticipates that the special relationship of Maori with the moana and with other taonga in the marine environment, the role of Maori as kaitiaki of natural marine resources and the other relationships and interests Maori have with the marine environment and the resources that rely on or are affected by the sea ...are intended to form an integral part of the factual matrix within which decisions on natural resources use, development and protection" (para 97).

42. The DMC found that these matters should be understood within the paradigm of "matauranga Maori".

43. Submissions from iwi, Chatham Island iwi and Ngai Tahu, provide more specific information on how these matters are affected by the application.

Uncertainty and lack of information is of particular concern

44. We are concerned that there are major gaps in the information provided in the EIA which mean the effects on the environment and existing interests are not

⁴ Ibid, s9.2.2, p 372

clear. We refer to the DWG submission which summarises these key gaps, including:

- a. information about the mining approach
- b. over-reliance on modelling work that has not been validated with real baseline data
- c. little information about the area that extends beyond that covered by CRPs mining permit.
- d. uncertainty surrounding the spatial extent of the plume, and its effect on the broader area under application
- e. lack of integrated analysis of the effects on fish of habitat destruction, suspended sediment, contaminants, smothering, effects on the food web and on juvenile fish, fish eggs and spawning behaviour.

45. The lack of analysis of the impacts of the proposal on the area that extends beyond the initial mining area is of particular concern given that the nature of the environment, including depth ranges, varies from the initial mining area, and the potential for a greater grouping of species to be affected. We are aware that concerns have been raised about stocks such as paua, rock lobster and eels – all of which are taonga to iwi. We refer to the submission made by the PauaMAC4 Industry Association Inc which highlights the lack of baseline information on the eastern end of the application area, and the uncertain impacts on Chatham Island coastal waters. In addition they note the potentially adverse impacts on these coastal waters of increased use of phosphate fertiliser as a result of CRP's commitment "to supply unprocessed rock phosphate to local farmers at cost or lower"⁵.

46. We also understand that a number of stock assessment plenary reports have commented that the abundance of the standing stock in CRA6 is possibly more dependent on immigration of larger lobsters into the area than it is on recruitment and growth.

47. In their review of the economic assessment developed for CRP by NZIER, Sapere research group point out a number of areas of uncertainty and inadequacy. They point to NZIER's conclusion that it is not possible to provide a quantitative measure for the environmental attributes that they have identified, including the value of the Chatham Rise fishery. They also comment on NZIER's assessment that the Benthic Protection Area does not overlap with bottom trawling and therefore (with the exception of long-lining), it will have limited economic impact.⁶ This fails to consider the role of BPAs in our regime for managing fishing and biodiversity. It is not possible to fully understand the full costs and benefits based on the information provided.

48. We are concerned that despite this lack of information, CRP concludes that the impact of the mining activity on fisheries and fishing interests is minimal.

⁵ Refer submission lodged by PauaMAC4 Industry Association Inc

⁶ Sapere: *Review of NZEIR report "Economic assessment of Chatham Rock Phosphate Input to the Environmental Impact Assessment"*, 19 May 2014, p8-9

Proposed mitigation and conditions inadequate

49. The onus is on CRP to provide convincing information to show that any adverse effects on the environment and existing interests can be avoided, remedied or mitigated. CRP summarise their proposed mitigation measures to include mining exclusion areas, evaluation of the feasibility and viability of creating hard substrate habitat to enhance recolonisation, measures to address the effects of mining on marine mammals and seabirds, monitoring to assess the impacts of sedimentation and an environmental compensation package.⁷
50. However it is not clear whether the proposed no-mining areas would be of a similar nature and quality as that protected by the BPA. In addition, while endeavouring to protect alternative areas, CRP cannot guarantee protection as they do not own or control the seabed, and do not have the power to prevent others from utilising the seabed.
51. Given the lack of clarity as to the extent and costs of environmental effects, we question whether the proposed compensation package is targeted at all those who will bear the costs of the proposal, and whether the amount proposed will fully compensate for those effects.
52. The adaptive management approach proposes mining of the initial area for five years, followed by mining of the broader area “if an economic resource is identified, monitoring has been carried out shows that the impacts of mining are as predicted, investigations of the new area ... have been completed and CRP have obtained a new mining permit covering the additional area to be mined”⁸. The monitoring program lacks quantitative performance standards with clear measures if these are exceeded. In addition it is unclear – aside from economic feasibility, on what basis mining in the broader area will occur after the first five years.
53. The hard substrate trials are just that – there is no guarantee that they will be effective.

⁷ Golder Associates (NZ) Ltd: *Chatham Rock Phosphate Ltd Proposed Mining Operation: Marine Consent Application and Environmental Impact Assessment. Non-technical summary.* May 2014. P 15

⁸ *Ibid*, p16

Appendix

Examples of settlement allocation

Examples of the model for allocation of settlement quota for stocks potentially affected by the proposal to mine phosphate from the Chatham Rise

The steps for determining how settlement quota is allocated can be summarised as follows:

Steps	Allocation approach
What is the total amount of settlement shares for the fish-stock?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10% if introduced into the QMS before the final settlement • 20% if introduced into the QMS after the final settlement
How is the stock classified and as a consequence what is the allocation approach? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deepwater → • Inshore → • Highly Migratory Species and stocks with no coastline boundary → • Freshwater → • Chathams Zone → 	Mix of population (75%) and coastline (25%) 100% coastline 100% by population By agreement between iwi whose rohe is in the QMA, or based on their relative resident populations Special rules – see below


Chatham Zone

The allocation model makes special provision for an allocation to the Chatham Zone of settlement quota based on a “separate fishery” defined as a zone 200nm from the extremities of the Chatham Islands.

The 200nm zone overlaps a similar zone extending 200 nm from the East Coast of the North and South Islands, to form an oval area defined as a shared zone. The proportion of catch derived from the Chatham Zone and shared zone determines the share of catch allocated under special rules in that zone:

- using a formula of 100% “inshore” stocks exclusively to iwi of the Chathams (Ngati Mutunga o Wharekauri and Moriori – who have agreed to share this 50/50);
- for “deepwater” stocks, 50% by coastline as shared above by the iwi of the Chathams and 50% to all iwi by population.


HOK1 (Hoki)



HOK1 was introduced into the quota management system before the Fisheries Settlement. Ten percent of the quota shares are derived from Settlement Quota.

Under the Maori Fisheries Act, HOK1 is classified as a “deepwater” stock which is shared by all 57 iwi based on a mix of their population and coastlines. In addition a portion of the QMA and areas where fish are harvested intersects with the Chatham Zone, which means that a greater portion of the settlement quota is allocated to Chatham iwi than under the general rules.

Ling 3 and 4




LIN3 and 4 were introduced into the QMS before the interim fisheries settlement. Around 9.6% of LIN3 is derived from Settlement Quota and 10% of LIN4.

Under the Maori Fisheries Act, LIN3 is classified as an “inshore” stock, so that 100% of the settlement quota is allocated to iwi whose coastline borders LIN3.

LIN4 is classified as “deepwater” stock. As a portion of the LIN4 QMA intersects with the Chatham Zone, a greater portion of the settlement quota is allocated to Chatham iwi than under the general rules.

Paua 4



PAU4 is classified as an “inshore” stock. Chatham iwi hold the Settlement Quota as 100% of settlement shares are allocated to iwi whose coastline borders PAU4.